The PropTech sector is experiencing a consolidation phase marked by high-profile failures. From Purplebricks' sale for one pound to McMakler's fight for survival -- we analyse the vulnerabilities of digital real estate business models, regulatory requirements under Section 34c of the German Trade Regulation Act and restructuring options for PropTech companies.
Table of Contents
- PropTech in Distress: When Digital Real Estate Platforms Stumble
- High-Profile Failures: Purplebricks, Homeday and McMakler
- Purplebricks -- From Stock Market Darling to Symbolic Sale
- Homeday -- Axel Springer's Difficult PropTech Bet
- McMakler -- Internal Power Struggles and a Fight for Survival
- Structural Vulnerabilities of PropTech Business Models
- The Commission Problem
- The iBuyer Debacle
- Real Estate Crisis Meets Start-up Dynamics
- Regulatory Framework: Section 34c of the German Trade Regulation Act
- Restructuring Options for PropTech Companies
- 1. Strategic Repositioning
- 2. Financial Restructuring
- 3. Operational Measures
- 4. Insolvency Law Instruments
- Lessons Learned: What Investors and Founders Should Bear in Mind
- Outlook
PropTech in Distress: When Digital Real Estate Platforms Stumble
The digitalisation of the real estate industry was long considered one of the most promising megatrends. Billions in venture capital flowed into so-called PropTech companies -- start-ups seeking to revolutionise the traditional property market through technology. From online agents to iBuyer models to digital valuation platforms, the euphoria knew few limits. Yet reality has caught up with many of these business models. High-profile failures, mass layoffs and fire sales now characterise an industry ground between technological ambition and economic reality.
The European PropTech market was valued at approximately USD 10.8 billion in 2024, with Germany accounting for over 21 per cent as the largest single market. Behind the aggregate growth figures, however, lie deep structural problems affecting the first generation of PropTech companies in particular.
High-Profile Failures: Purplebricks, Homeday and McMakler
Purplebricks -- From Stock Market Darling to Symbolic Sale
The most dramatic case in the European PropTech sector is arguably the fall of Purplebricks. The British company started in 2014 with a simple promise: selling homes for a fixed fee rather than the traditional percentage-based commission. After its IPO in 2015, Purplebricks was at times valued in the billions. However, aggressive international expansion into Australia and the United States burned cash, profitability remained elusive, and investor confidence eroded. In May 2023, Purplebricks was ultimately sold to competitor Strike for a symbolic GBP 1 -- a company once worth billions ended as a bargain. Around 750 jobs were at stake.
Homeday -- Axel Springer's Difficult PropTech Bet
Berlin-based Homeday likewise illustrates the sector's fragility. Axel Springer and Purplebricks jointly acquired 26 per cent of Homeday in 2018 and invested a further EUR 40 million in 2020. Ultimately, Axel Springer assumed full control; the founders left the company and around 40 employees had to go. A classic example of how heavy investment alone does not create a viable business model.
McMakler -- Internal Power Struggles and a Fight for Survival
The trajectory of McMakler has been particularly turbulent. The Berlin PropTech, once celebrated as a billion-euro hope, underwent multiple rounds of layoffs and internal power struggles. Investors blocked agreements, and prosecutors investigated allegations of social insurance fraud. Although McMakler managed to secure financing in the low tens of millions, the case exemplifies how quickly a PropTech can go from the fast lane to fighting for its very existence.
Structural Vulnerabilities of PropTech Business Models
The Commission Problem
Many PropTech companies built their business model on disruptively low commissions or fixed fees. What looks convincing on paper often fails in practice:
- High customer acquisition costs: Digital agents must invest heavily in online marketing to win mandates
- Low repeat rates: Property transactions are infrequent events -- customer lifetime value is limited
- Quality perception: Many sellers associate low fees with lower service quality
The iBuyer Debacle
The so-called iBuyer model -- in which platforms purchase properties directly, renovate them and resell -- has proven particularly loss-making. The most prominent example is Zillow, which shut down its iBuying programme in 2021 after losses exceeding USD 1 billion and laid off 25 per cent of its workforce. Opendoor likewise struggles with heavy losses -- in August 2022, the company lost money on 42 per cent of homes sold. The core problems:
- Algorithmic mispricing: Even sophisticated algorithms cannot reliably capture local market dynamics and individual property characteristics
- Balance sheet risk: Large property portfolios on the balance sheet create significant interest rate and market risk
- Operational complexity: Physically purchasing, renovating and reselling properties requires an entirely different competence from operating a technology platform
Real Estate Crisis Meets Start-up Dynamics
The current state of the German property market exacerbates the problems considerably. The ZIA Spring Report 2026 paints a sobering picture: the industry's recovery is fragile, office take-up fell by 8 per cent in 2025, vacancies are rising, and only 215,000 completed dwellings are expected for 2026 -- against an annual requirement of over 257,000 units. For PropTech companies dependent on transaction volumes, this is an existential threat.
At the same time, insolvency statistics show that 24,064 corporate insolvencies were recorded in Germany in 2025 -- an increase of 10.3 per cent. Almost 59 per cent of insolvent companies were less than ten years old. PropTech start-ups burning cash during the growth phase and reliant on follow-on financing face a considerably more restrictive funding climate.
Regulatory Framework: Section 34c of the German Trade Regulation Act
A frequently underestimated aspect of PropTech business models is the regulatory requirements. In Germany, anyone wishing to act commercially as a real estate agent needs a licence under Section 34c of the Trade Regulation Act (GewO). The requirements include:
- Personal reliability of the applicant
- Orderly financial circumstances (certificate of good conduct, trade register extract, debt register check)
- Continuing education obligation: 20 hours of professional development within three years for all persons directly involved in brokerage
- Compliance with the Broker and Developer Regulation (MaBV) and its special bookkeeping, information and notification obligations
For PropTech companies operating with agile structures and rapid scaling, these requirements can become a genuine hurdle -- especially when they rely on freelancer models or decentralised agent networks. Regulatory compliance must be built into the business model from the outset.
Restructuring Options for PropTech Companies
PropTech companies in distress have various options depending on the severity of the crisis and available assets:
1. Strategic Repositioning
- Focus on profitable core areas rather than broad-based expansion
- Shift from a B2C to a B2B model (white-label technology for traditional agents)
- Hybrid models: combination of digital platform and personal advisory
2. Financial Restructuring
- Negotiation with investors on down rounds or convertible loans
- Sale-and-leaseback of technology assets
- Debt-to-equity swaps to clean up the balance sheet
3. Operational Measures
- Consolidation of offices and overhead structures
- Outsourcing of non-core functions
- Technology optimisation: reduction of infrastructure costs through cloud migration and automation
4. Insolvency Law Instruments
In advanced distress situations, the instruments of the German Insolvency Code -- in particular debtor-in-possession proceedings under Sections 270 et seq. InsO or the insolvency plan under Sections 217 et seq. InsO -- can be suitable paths to restructure the company or at least preserve valuable technology assets.
Lessons Learned: What Investors and Founders Should Bear in Mind
The PropTech crisis teaches important lessons:
- Unit economics before growth: No business model survives permanently negative contribution margins per transaction -- not even with venture capital
- Take regulation seriously: The requirements of Section 34c GewO and the MaBV are not formalities but existential compliance obligations
- Factor in cyclicality: Property markets are cyclical -- a business model that only works during a boom is not a viable business model
- Technology as enabler, not end in itself: The best PropTech companies use technology to improve existing processes -- not to replace them entirely
- Engage restructuring expertise early: At the first signs of distress, professional advice should be sought before room for manoeuvre narrows
Outlook
The PropTech sector will not disappear -- quite the contrary. The digitalisation of the real estate industry is an irreversible trend. But the first wave of the PropTech revolution has demonstrated that disruption alone is not a business model. The winners of the next phase will be those companies that combine technology with solid economic fundamentals and regard the regulatory framework as a mark of quality.
According to the JLL Spark PropTech Forecast, AI-powered solutions, energy optimisation and ESG-compliant building technology will be the next growth areas. But for these companies too, the rule stands: without viable unit economics and an awareness of regulatory compliance, technology alone will not suffice.
At compleneo, we support PropTech companies and their investors in managing crisis situations -- from restructuring advisory and regulatory compliance through to insolvency-law-based reorganisation. Get in touch.